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Abstract—Automated People Movers (APM) are systems for
passenger transport with fully automated operation and high
frequency service. Trains controllers are traditionally centralized
and based on wired circuits, although they generally have
serious difficulties in the installation and maintenance. As there
is increased demand on the system, there are advantages in
choosing an open architecture, with a simple communication
system and distributed. These concepts are largely addressed
in the development of IEC 61850. In this study we proposed
the adaptation of the standard IEC 61850, design to be used
in electric power systems to be applied in an APM system
named Aeromovel installed in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Aeromovel
is a nonconventional Automatic People Mover whose operation
principle is based on pneumatics. A model, based on timed
automata formalism, is proposed for IEC 61850 communications
requirements and respective simulation results are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
An Automated People Mover (APM) is a fully automated,
grade-separated mass transit system. The term is generally
used only to describe systems serving relatively small areas,
such as airports, downtown districts or theme parks, but is
sometimes applied to considerably more complex automated
systems. Usually, they circulate in headways that do not
interfere with other traffic ways in order to guarantee safety
for passengers and security for the system [1].
From the existing APMs, about one-quarter of them function
as urban metros; the remainder are short-range, privately built
shuttles and loops that operate as an integral part of the
functioning of airports, amusement parks, institutions, and
shopping centre across North America, Europe, and Japan.
They all have in common a high level of frequent service.
Some of these (that belong to the earlier generations), have
been operating since the late 1960s [2]–[7].
An APM realizes automatically the control of movement,
the execution of the safety instructions and of the direction
of the trains. The automatic realization of these functions is
assured by the Automated Train Controller (ATC) system that
is composed by the following sub-systems:
• ATP - Automatic Train Protection. Protection against
collisions, excess of speed, invasion of the train way,
among other danger situations;
• ATO - Automatic Train Operation. Speed control, pro-
grammed stops at the stations and control of the doors,
among other operations of the same kind (usually, in
a non-automated transportation system, these operations
would be associated at the train operator).
• ATS - Automatic Train Supervision. Functions of mon-
itoring and adjustment of the individual performance
of each train, in order to guarantee the schedule of
departures and arrivals of trains.
An ATC must include, an ATP system and, optionally, it can
include the ATO and/or ATS systems. In order to guarantee
the communication among these systems, the standard IEEE
Standard for Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC)
Performance and Functional Requirements [1] must be fol-
lowed. This standard describes the functional requirements
and also the communications performance concerning the
described controller systems of the APM (Communications
Based Train Control - CBTC). The main characteristic of
CTBC include:
• Information about the precise positioning of the train,
not-dependent of the sensors of the way.
• Continuous communication between the train and other
processes that are not directly related with him.
• Verification of the train control conditions for the ATP.
Functionalities of ATO and ATS can be also realized.
For example, to activate the train braking system, it is
necessary that the central control has information, constantly
updated, about the speed, the current location of each vehicle
on the highway and the time required for activation of the
brake, in order to perform the braking under the braking
desired trajectory thereby avoiding the collision between ve-
hicles.
The IEEE Standard for Communications-Based Train Con-
trol (CBTC) Performance and Functional Requirements [1]
describes the functional and performance requirements for
using CBTC systems. This standard provides typical values,
such as, for example, the resolution of speed, range and
reaction time of communication equipment used in the CBTC.
For integration of the ATC, it is used the IEEE Standard
for Communications Protocol Aboard Trains [8] that defines
the communication protocol among instrument vehicles and
among vehicles. This standard defines two solutions according
to the application: the protocol 1473-L (LonWorks) and 1473-
T (TCN).
The type 1473-L is based on EIA 709.1-1998 and on the
EAI 709.3-1998. It can be configured to support buses sensors
(local sensor bus - LSB) or applications (local bus vehicle
applications - LVB). The LSB connects the sensors and the
LVB connects embedded devices to the vehicle operating
system.
The type 1473-T is based on IEC 61375-1-1999 and is
dedicated for applications that require time determinism and
is divided in protocols WTB (Wire Train Bus) and MVB
(Multifunction Vehicle Bus). The WTB interconnect trains
operating units and the MVB interconnect embedded devices
to the vehicles operating system. One major benefit of this
configuration is the possibility of using equipment from dif-
ferent manufacturers [9].
In [10], it was observed, in the types 1473-L and 1473-T,
the lack of support for new demands for video transmission,
the missing of IP interfaces preventing communication via
Ethernet, for example, and the lack of protocols used for
systems integration Advanced Train Control System (ATCS).
According to [11], protection system and train control are
traditionally based on wired circuits with centralized oper-
ation. Although they generally have a simple design, there
are serious difficulties in the installation and maintenance.
In case where there is increased demand on the system,
there are advantages in choosing an open architecture, with
a simple communication system. These concepts are largely
addressed in the development of IEC 61850, designed to
be a communication standard for electrical substations based
on the use of IEDs (Intelligent Electronic Devices), that is
replacing the older protective relays. The IEC 61850 combine
functions of protection, control and communication in the
same equipment. In general, its application results in the an
following benefits [11], [12]:
• Reduced cabling.
• Reduced cost and installation time.
• Increased capacity for monitoring and control systems
protection.
• Separated infrastructure and functionality.
• Interoperability.
• Comprehensive ”System Configuration Language” (SCL)
for the whole life-cycle from design to engineering,
operation and maintenance.
• Supports multi-vendor systems.
The IEC 61850 standard has requirements such as real-
time control and distributed object orientation programming
and provides a standard for integration of substations from
specification of reporting requirements, functional character-
istics, data structure and the nomenclature for devices and
data. It also provides standards for operational characteristics,
defining, for example, how to interact with the applications of
control devices and how they should be tested for compliance
analysis of the system.
With regard to the requirements of APM control systems,
IEC 61850 is based on ASN.1, according to the IEEE
Trial-Use Standard for Message Set Template for Intelligent
Systems Transportation (IEEE, 2000). IEC 61850 uses the
following communication protocols:
• Generic Object Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE).
Used for asynchronous, unsolicited and heartbeat mes-
sages. This message is sent to the network with high
priority and real-time requirements;
• Sample Value (SMV). Used for exchanging data between
machines. Through this message it is possible to perform
signal processing distributed equipment. It also has real
time requirements;
• Manufacturing Messaging Specification (MMS). It is
used for supervisory system communications and remote
configuration. It has no real-time requirements.
According to the IEC 61850, the control system is divided
into three levels related the hierarchy of functionality:
• Functions of the process level: In this level, all functions
that have direct interface with the process are located.
The state of the system are determined through the use of
analog or binary indications. Traditionally, these signals
are transmitted via wiring in the form of current intensity
or voltage and auxiliary switches.
• Functions Bay Level: All the functions that act directly
on the level of process equipment are located in this level.
This functions have features such as switching equipment.
• Function Level Station: In this level all the other features
are located. These are divided into two groups:
– Related to Processes: Functions that use data from
more than one level of bay.
– Related to interfaces: Functions related to com-
munication with HMI (human machine interface),
SCADA systems (Supervisory and Data Acquisition)
or with a remote station.
Currently, there are applications in the areas of hydropower,
wind energy and distributed generation. It is proposed, in the
present study, the expansion of the IEC 61850 standard to
APM systems performing a CBTC.
Besides the benefits mentioned by [11]. The IEC 61850
presents the possibility of integration of APM control system
with power systems, such as distributed generation systems,
which may relate the output from the vehicle with the goal of
minimizing costs.
All protocols are object-oriented and based on distributed
control. The data types are described below:
• Physical Device. Object accessed by the network address.
• Logical device. Contains a collection of logical nodes
deployed in an IED that is not distributed.
• Logical Node. Functions that represent the actual func-
tions in the system.
• Attributes and Data. Properties of logical nodes, for
example, position or configuration.
To use IEC 61850 standard in APM systems, safety aspects
related with operation of these systems are crucial. There are
safety requirements that must be accomplished when these
systems are operating. These safety requirements are defined
by International Standards - as mentioned above - and cover
all the aspects of the system controller.
The application of all IEC 61850 requirements to an Auto-
mated People Mover Controller is a large and very complex
task. One suitable approach to accomplish the goals of this
large project is to create a large global model that considers
the communication protocols proposed by the standard, guar-
anteeing the accomplishment of all time delays. To simulate
the very large model it is necessary to choose the appropriated
tools and software, so, it could be used Formal Verification
techniques in order to guarantee a set of behaviors defined by
the standard.
As it is an ongoing work, in this paper, it is presented
a model for IEC 61850 communication requirements and
respective simulation results when developing a controller
specification of an APM.
In the IEC 61850 standard protocols context the GOOSE
is the first one that must be analyzed. The Automated People
Mover that is used in this study uses pneumatic power for
moving the vehicles. In this system the combination of a
pneumatic propulsion system control and the control of a set
of on-off and proportional valves is crucial to guarantee the
system dependability. To this we used Formal Verification and
Simulation Techniques.
Several formalisms can be used to model timed systems.
Timed automata were adopted as the modeling formalism for
system modeling due to two main reasons: first, the study of
the proposed system needs to take time evolution into account;
and, second, time is the input formalism of the UPPAAL
model-checker [13]. Even if UPPAAL is a Model-Checker,
in this paper, it is used only as a Simulator. The next step of
our approach will be to use Formal Verification Technique.
This paper os organizes as follows: Section II presents the
Aeromovel system while Section III is devoted to the IEC
61850 requirements modeling. Section IV presents the results
of the simulation of the controller specification and, finally,
conclusions and perspectives of future work are presented in
Section V.
II. Aeromovel SYSTEM
The main features of the Aeromovel technology are the ex-
clusive traffic on the route, the high ratio of useful load/weight
carried and external traction. These characteristics are due,
respectively to the fact that the car travels above the ground
in a unique way and have external power system. This makes it
relatively lighter than other similar transport systems, allowing
less weight for the beams over which it operates, reducing the
building installation and maintenance of the system [14].
The Aeromovel uses rail technology in the interface between
the vehicle and the ground. Thus, as the friction metal/metal
below the rubber/concrete less energy is lost duw to friction
effects. The vehicle has four-wheel independent sets, allowing
the Aeromovel to make curves with radii smaller than conven-
tional trains, which have fixed wheels on the axes. The flaps
are articulated, allowing the vehicle to make turns and moves
uphill and downhill without contact with the duct wall [14].
The power unit, known as power train group or propulsion
system, is responsible for generating differential pressure and
is basically composed of an asynchronous electric motor that
drives and industrial centrifugal fan [15]. Each power train
group is connected to the main duct through a pipeline with
1m2 of cross-sectional area.
The proposed fluidic power system (Fig. 1) consists of an
industrial centrifugal fan (with air flow of up to 106m3/h)
and a set of two proportional valves (VP0 and VP1) that
allow to control the pressure and, consequently, the force
imposed to the vehicle and eight on-off valves (V0, V1,. . . ,V7).
That impose the effect of the fan switching on the main duct
through which the vehicle moves. They can perform inflation
or exhaust of the air on the duct, as seen in Fig. 1. The valves
used in the Aeromovel system are characterized by causing
obstruction of flow throught angular movement. Pneumatic
pistons are used to rotate the flaps of the valve.
Fig. 1. Layout of the power train group
According to [16] the Aeromovel system can be segmented
into sections between two stations, which are called ”Standard-
Block”. The standard block is formed by two power train
groups, one at each station and a vehicle. This configuration
allows three different types of operation modes of the system:
• Push - the vehicle is pushed by the pressure caused
by the operation of the power train group upstream of
vehicle. In the chamber downstream of the vehicle, the
atmospheric valve is opened, communicating the duct to
the atmosphere.
• Pull - the vehicle is pulled by the low pressure caused
by the operation of power train group downstream of
the vehicle. In the chamber upstream of the vehicle, the
atmospheric valve is opened, connecting the duct to the
atmosphere.
• Push-Pull - both power train groups are connected to
the duct and the two atmospheric valves are closed.
Thus, the vehicle moves due to the upstream pressure
and downstream vacuum. In this form of operation, the
vehicle may develop higher speeds.
One of the difficulties of working with the power train group
is that the change of states (from push to pull for example)
may cause safety problems for people and security problems
for the equipment because the valves can briefly set up a power
train group in addition to the three states mentioned above.
To avoid making changes of states of the valves in sequence
(which implies a longer time to change) it is proposed in this
paper, the inclusion of a condition called OFFLINE, where
the power train group does not influence the movement of
the vehicle, independently of the state of the motor, since
the segments valves remain closed (V1 and V4) while the
atmospheric segment valves remain opened (V0 and V5). Thus,
independently of the other valves, there is no interference
in the movement of the vehicle while the propulsion system
remains in the OFFLINE state. This state is used during the
exchange process between the states PUSH and PULL or when
the vehicle remains stopped at the station.
III. IEC 61850 REQUIREMENTS MODELING
This paper details the study of peer-to-peer GOOSE mes-
sages. All the system (controller and plant, in closed-loop
behavior) is modeled and the entire model is composed by
sixty-two (62) timed finite automaton modules.
The train control system is usually centralized, but, aiming
a solution based on the IEC 61850 standard [11], the models
were developed based on distributed controllers so, in the
models, it is considered real-time operation dedicated to each
individual device. The units are connected to a communication
bus that provides information exchange with other processing
unit responsible for interfacing with the user, thus reducing
the processing request individually. In general, the decision to
use a distributed control system is motivated by cost reduction
and by an increased system flexibility.
Models of plant system devices and controllers were de-
veloped using timed automata formalism and analyzed using
UPPAAL software for simulation.
The model was divided into the following templates:
GOOSE Server, GOOSE Client and Bus and Logical Node.
With respect to the implemented GOOSE protocol model, the
following characteristics were taken in account (see Fig. 2 and
Fig. 3):
• The messages are asynchronous and unsolicited;
• The GOOSE protocol is encapsulated directly in an
Ethernet layer. The messages are connectionless, so the
model does not verify the connection stability (without
confirmation from receivers).
• The messages are multicast. Only clients or servers in the
same VLAN (virtual LAN) can send or listen packages
and must be a Bus Model to each VLAN (the template
model has facilities to support this configuration).
• In the case of confirmation from receivers, the retrans-
mission is used to increase the probability of successful
reception.
The Bus Model (see Fig. 4) has a FIFO (First In, First Out)
queue with 4 ms (milliseconds) delay and the total delays
of frames flow introduced by network and communication
processors are allocated only in the Bus Model (a typical
GOOSE total transfer time is 4ms) (see Fig. 5).
The GOOSE Server has three basic states: NON-
EXISTENT, RETRANSMIT-PENDING and RETRANSMIT.
The Logical Node has been configured to send GOOSE Mes-
sages (GoEna==true). The server transmits the first package
setting SqNum to 0 (this variable is incremented for each
transmission, but will rollover to 1 and set to zero when
StNum is updated), StNum to 1 (this variable is used to
define how many times the equipment has changed state) and
timeAllowedtoLive to 2 (this variables are in the structure
called SendGooseMessage). The time to wait for the next
transmission (timeAllowedtoLive) is set to 2n (n=1) and is
incremented by n+1 until 1024ms.
Fig. 6 shows the waiting time for the next re-transmission
when th is the heartbeat time (1024ms), t0 is an indeterminate
time by an asynchronous changing status, t1 is 21ms, t2 is
2
2ms, t3 is 23ms, t4 is 24ms and so on.
GOOSE Server sends messages to Bus Model by copying
the structure SendGooseMessage to the structure busGsePdu
(according VLAN) and sends a signal by channel to Bus
Model. The Bus Model receives the signal and copies the
busGsePdu structure to a queue and does a time registry. After
the delay (4 ms), the Bus Model removes the data from the
queue and copies again to the busGsePdu structure, sending a
broadcast channel to all GOOSE Clients which are listening
the VLAN. The Bus Model is the same to Sample Value and
GOOSE Messages, but has difference in the queue (because
those messages have different structures).
The GOOSE Clients receives the signal by broadcast chan-
nel and copies the busGsePdu structure to the local memory,
verifying the interest (initially configured). If the data is not
important, it is discarded and the GOOSE Client comeback to
the listen state. If the information that is arriving is important,
then the GOOSE Client model ”calls” the Logical Node
Controller, does the necessary actions and comeback to the
listen state.
To integrate the Aeromovel models with GOOSE Protocol
we use, according to IEC 61850, one Logical Node to one
function or equipment on the system. In the Fig. 7, the GMP
Controller communicates with Valve Controller by GOOSE
Messages. For example, if the GMP Controller needs to
change the GMP to offline mode, a command will be sent
to the GMP Controller Logical Node end packet (array form)
in a GOOSE Message format by the GOOSE Server. This
message is sent to Bus and, according to the delay, will be
received by Valve Controller GOOSE Client. GOOSE Client
will verify the packet and will send a message by channel to
the Valve Controller which changes the valve model according
with time to change the valve status.
QUESTIONABLE
VALID t<=cpyGsePdu[ln_id].timeAllowedtoLive
NON_EXISTENT
busGsePdu[vlan_id].gocbRef != read_ln_idbusGsePdu[vlan_id].gocbRef == read_ln_id
in[vlan_id]?
cpyGsePdu[ln_id].stNum == busGsePdu[vlan_id].stNum
cpyGsePdu[ln_id] = busGsePdu[vlan_id],
t=0
busGsePdu[vlan_id].gocbRef != read_ln_id
cpyGsePdu[ln_id].stNum != busGsePdu[vlan_id].stNum
cpyGsePdu[ln_id].stNum = busGsePdu[vlan_id].stNum
busGsePdu[vlan_id].gocbRef == read_ln_id
in[vlan_id]?
data=cpyGsePdu[ln_id].allData,
t=0
busGsePdu[vlan_id].gocbRef != read_ln_id
busGsePdu[vlan_id].gocbRef == read_ln_id
cpyGsePdu[ln_id] = busGsePdu[vlan_id]
in[vlan_id]?
t==cpyGsePdu[ln_id].timeAllowedtoLive
Fig. 2. GOOSE Client Model
RETRANSMIT
RETRANSMIT_PENDING
t<=LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.timeAllowedtoLive
NON_EXISTENT
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.stNum>=INT32U
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.stNum=1
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.stNum<INT32U
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.stNum++
busGsePdu[vlan_id]=LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage
trip[ln_id]?
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.sqNum = 0,
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.timeAllowedtoLive=2
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.sqNum<INT32U
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.sqNum++
out[vlan_id]!
t=0
t==LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.timeAllowedtoLive
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.timeAllowedtoLive>=MAX_TTL
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.timeAllowedtoLive<MAX_TTL
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.timeAllowedtoLive=
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.timeAllowedtoLive*2
LN[ln_id].GoEna==true
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.stNum = 1,
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.sqNum = 0,
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.gocbRef = ln_id,
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.timeAllowedtoLive=2
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.sqNum>=INT32U
LN[ln_id].SendGOOSEMessage.sqNum=1
Fig. 3. GOOSE Server Model
BUFFER_OVERFLOW
RECV
SEND t<=TIMER
len++
type==SMV
busSmvPdu[vlan_id] = lstSmvPdu[0]
t==TIMER && 
len>0 &&
len<(BUFF-1)
len<(BUFF-1)
bus_out[vlan_id]?
type==SMV
lstSmvPdu[len] = busSmvPdu[vlan_id]
len>=(BUFF-1)
bus_in[vlan_id]!
len--
len==0
t=timer[len].in=timer[len].ttl=TIMER-DELAY
t=timer[0].ttl
i:int[0,TIMER]
len>0 && (i<=t && (i+1)>t)
calc_ttl(i)
deq()
type==GSE
lstGsePdu[len] = busGsePdu[vlan_id]t==TIMER && len==0
type==GSE
busGsePdu[vlan_id] = lstGsePdu[0]
Fig. 4. Bus Model
Fig. 5. Communications Delay
Fig. 6. Waiting time for the next re-transmission
For each Logical Node, there is only one GOOSE Server
and no one or more GOOSE Clients. For example, if the
GMP Controller needs to know the status of ten valves, then
the Logical Node GMP Controller needs one GMP Server
(sending the corresponding commands to valves) and ten GMP
Clients for each valve (listening).
Fig. 7. Integrated Logical Nodes
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS OF THE CONTROLLER’S
SPECIFICATION
For all the models, the range of all variables has been
limited in order to decrease the necessary computational effect,
allowing to obtain results. For all the locations of the entire
automata model - with exception of the ”committed” locations
- it is necessary a time interval to allow the evolutions in all
automaton models, from one to another location.
Concerning simulation results, the data of the file XTR
(simulation registry) was been used to obtain the diagram of
Fig. 8. In this figure, it is possible to see the retransmission
messages made by the increment of the SqNum and stNum
variables in the time.
Fig. 8. Simulation Results
The simulated result is the expected one for this system.
However, formal verification is also necessary in order avail
the behavior of the GOOSE communications.
At this moment, formal verification has been used, only
for the deadlock checking (formal description: ”A[] NOT
DEADLOCK”), with DBM - Difference Bounded Matrices [17]
state space representation, but not yet considered, concerning
all the system with GOOSE protocol, because the model of
the system is now a very large and complex - composed
by sixty-two (62) modules - and the computational available
capacity is not enough to obtain the results of the full model.
To deal with this problem, it will be necessary to use partial
formal verification [18], [19] and/or abstraction modeling tech-
niques [20] to handle with the full model, in order to obtain
more complex formal verification results, associated to more
complex behavior properties of the controller specification.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
IEC 61850 requirements were modeled in order to obtain
a dependable specification for an APM system. The obtained
results, concerning simulation of the obtained specification,
are satisfactory and allow us to conclude that the developed
specification accomplishes the requirements of the IEC 61850
standard.
The adopted formalism (timed automata) used to develop
the specification of the system will allows to consider formal
verification technique to validate some critical behaviors of the
system. In order to accomplish there goals. The reducing of
the variable size will be tested because it should be decrease
the necessary processing time and computer memory used to
perform the formal verification tasks. For example, stNum has
2
32 bytes, but we intend to use it with 28 bytes because
the functionality is same. Partial formal verification and/or
abstraction modeling techniques will also be used in order to
reduce the memory and time consuming for obtaining formal
verification results.
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